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REMEDY FOR BANKING CRISES: WHAT CHICAGO 
AND ISLAM HAVE IN COMMON: A COMMENT 
 
MABID ALI AL-JARHI∗ 
 
Repeated failure of banks led some economists to believe that the banking and 
financial system may be suffering from structural problems and is in need of 
fundamental reform. The Islamic monetary system is known to consider demand 
and investment deposits as two distinct contracts. Demand deposits are merely 
loans that are fully guaranteed by banks and must be returned on demand. 
Investment deposits are given to banks on a profit-and-loss sharing basis. They are 
clearly associated with risk-taking and have specific maturities which, in principle, 
are not revocable. Compared to conventional finance, this sounds like narrow 
banking. Garcia, Marino and Cibils (2000) find similarities between narrow 
banking and Islamic banking. As narrow banking seems to be an uncommon 
concept among specialists in Islamic economics, this comment is rather expanded 
to explain the what and why of narrow banking. The paper concludes that narrow 
banking bears similarities with Islamic banking. Under narrow banking, the role of 
investment banks would carry features similar to Islamic banking when the 
relationship between savers and banks are considered. However, when it comes to 
financing investment, Islamic banks avoid trading future for present money, while 
conventional investment banks stick to the interest-based modes of finance. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Stability is a basic requirement for the proper functioning of the banking system 
and a key to its contribution to growth and development. During the 1980s, the 
failure of banks became a common phenomenon that preceded economic crises. 
Bank lending followed a cycle that usually ended with increased bank failures and 
high loan losses. Bank insurance funds in countries with deposit guarantee schemes 
have lost substantial amounts, causing the loss of taxpayers’ money. This led some 
economists to argue that the banking and financial system may be suffering from 
structural problems and is in need of fundamental reform (Spong, 1993). 
 
 The Islamic monetary system is known to consider demand and investment 
deposits as two distinct contracts. Demand deposits are merely loans that are fully 
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guaranteed by banks and must be returned on demand. Like conventional banking, 
demand deposits are associated with liquidity services, e.g., checking, immediate 
transfer and withdrawal. Investment deposits are given to banks on a profit-and-
loss sharing basis. They are clearly associated with risk-taking and have specific 
maturities which, in principle, are not revocable. That is why some economists 
insisted on the total separation between demand and investment deposits through 
subjecting the former to 100 percent required reserves (Al-Jarhi 1981, 1983). 
Compared to conventional finance, this sounds like narrow banking.  
 
 Kenneth Spong (1993) argues for the implementation of narrow banking on the 
basis that it would improve the competitiveness of banks and makes them more 
market responsive. With regard to the latter point, he suggests that narrow banking 
would make deposit insurance unnecessary. 
 
 Garcia, Marino and Cibils (2000) find similarities between narrow banking and 
Islamic banking. In Islamic banking demand deposits are perfectly guaranteed, 
while investments are financed through investment deposits that are similar to 
mutual fund shares. Some economists have insisted that Islamic banking must be 
complemented with 100 percent required reserves (Al-Jarhi, 1981) for stability 
reasons on the one hand, and to meet the absolute guarantee of demand deposits. 
 
 The real problem is how to construct financial institutions that support and 
enhance economic development, but are flexible enough to allow for technological 
innovation and market discipline (Phillips, 1992b). 
 
 As narrow banking seems to be an uncommon concept among specialists in 
Islamic economics, this comment is rather expanded to explain the what and why 
of narrow banking, how it relates to banking theory, its relationship with the long 
series of proposals for monetary reform, its pros and cons, and finally how it relates 
to Islamic banking. 
II. NARROW BANKING  
A. What and Why1 
 The main distinguished feature of “Narrow Banks” lies in their deposit-taking 
function. Their deposit accounts would be entirely backed with marketable low-risk 
securities and currency, thereby providing a perfectly safe payments system. Their 
deposits would be perfect substitutes for currency. As narrow banking is specially 
designed to insure monetary stability, it would eliminate the need for deposit 
insurance.  
                                                     
1 This section borrows heavily from Spong (1993). 
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 Narrow banks’ income includes interest earned on securities and fees charged 
for transaction service, a part of which should cover operating costs, leaving 
competitive returns on equity, despite operating on low margins, thanks to their 
small capital requirements. In addition, narrow banks would encounter very little 
regulatory burden.  
 
 One of the possible variations of narrow banking is to establish separate entities 
offering transaction accounts and related services, leaving bank lending to separate 
affiliate organizations funded on an uninsured basis. Affiliate activities could be 
left to the discipline of the uninsured investors and market forces. 
 
 Other variations include offering “deposited currency” and “collateralized or 
secured money,” backed by liquid low-risk securities without splitting banks into 
transaction and lending entities. Under the latter variation, narrow banks would 
back their deposits with central bank accounts representing a proportionate interest 
in the system’s portfolio of securities, in order to allow regulators to monitor 
directly a bank’s security holdings. 
B. Benefits of Narrow Banking 
 Narrow banking offers two significant benefits. First, it would eliminate the 
incongruence between bank liabilities (deposits, available at par and on demand) 
and assets (illiquid and risky loans). Such incongruence leads the banking system 
to depend upon an extensive government supported safety net that includes: deposit 
insurance, discount window lending and rigorous regulation and supervision to 
control. Second, narrow banking eliminates the need for extensive governmental 
involvement in bank lending and other policy decisions that extends far beyond the 
protection of the payments system. 
C. Questions About Narrow Banking 
 The adoption of narrow banking would require a significant transformation of 
the current financial system raising legitimate questions regarding the overall 
benefits, weaknesses, and implementation concerns of narrow banking. 
1. Does narrow banking provide stability? 
 In his evaluation of narrow banking, Miles (2001) postulates that under narrow 
banking, banks operate like finance companies, and other non-bank financial 
institutions (NBFI’s). If finance companies can provide stable lending during 
conditions of tight credit, narrow banking should be preferable. However, finance 
companies are more vulnerable to tight credit conditions than commercial banks.  
 
 Miles sees that NBFIs suffer from high agency costs and provide a less stable 
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supply of credit relative to deposit-insured banks. He relates the greater stability of 
banks to the deposit-insurance subsidy they enjoy. The removal of this subsidy 
would put banks and NBFIs on a more equal footing in the competition for loans, 
but according to Miles, the supply of lending in the economy would then be less 
stable, bringing back the question of how to provide stable credit without distorting 
regulation. Miles’ results simply imply that narrow banking, in the form of a 
growing NBFI sector, has no place in financial development.  
 
 Bossone (2002) argues that narrowing the scope of banking would, at best, 
produce uncertain benefits in terms of greater financial stability while exacting 
heavy costs in terms of efficiency and credit availability. Narrow banking is seen 
by Bossone to sever the link between liquidity, money, credit, and economic 
activity. He claims that narrow banking suppresses bank money as an instrument to 
finance lending to the private sector, thereby creating “market incompleteness2”. 
Financial firms would jump to fill in the gap by undertaking conventional banking 
activities, bringing back the risks that narrow banking was supposed to eliminate. 
 
 Bossone warns that proposals to move to narrow banking in developing 
countries should be resisted, given the absence of a well-developed secondary 
market for government securities, a highly volatile environment for securities 
prices, the existence of sovereign risk, and a non-credible government commitment 
to refrain from insuring deposits or widely held financial instruments. 
 
 Bossone, however, does not object to employing narrow banking to weak banks 
at times of crises in order to improve their balance sheets (World Bank 2001). He 
does not object to individual institutions’ offering narrow banking services to their 
customers on a voluntary basis, or creating narrow bank subsidiaries that would be 
segregated from other businesses within the same bank holding companies. 
2. What would happen to credit availability?  
 Narrow banking would, in a conventional banking system, redirect all credit 
functions of depository institutions toward bank credit affiliates and other market 
lenders. A shift toward other market lenders is already occurring. Narrow bank 
lending affiliates could help banking firms reduce their costs and run their lending 
operations more efficiently. 
 
 To attract funding, affiliates would have to meet market standards for 
capitalization, asset quality, and other performance measures. Much of the equity 
the banking system could be diverted to credit affiliates.  
                                                     
2 Market incompleteness occurs whenever mutually beneficial trades of goods or services 
are prohibited. 
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 A more flexible lending framework could enable lending affiliates to attract 
additional capital, using securitization and asset sales or placements to reduce 
overall capital needs. 
3. Would limited access to market funding restrict lending by smaller banking 
firms and would affiliate lenders be willing to provide the same variety of 
loans offered by banks?  
 Smaller firms lack direct access to major credit markets and have to obtain 
much of their funding from local investors. Small banks may therefore require a 
lengthy transition period. 
 
 The type of lending by affiliates could differ from that of banks due to 
differences in funding and market pressures. However, a strong demand for certain 
varieties would eventually entice some affiliates or other lenders to provide them. 
 
 In recent years, the credit-granting abilities of nonbank lenders have increased 
substantially with the growth of securitization, commercial paper, and other 
securities instruments. As a result, nonbank lenders, investors, and affiliates would 
seem to be capable of fulfilling the general credit needs of the economy. If affiliates 
were given freedom to participate in debt and equity markets, funding would be 
expected to improve. 
4. Would narrow banks be competitive with other financial firms? 
 Narrow banks are less encumbered by regulatory burden and can offer their 
depositors a return competitive with low-risk investment alternatives. Their ability 
to offer a complete range of payments services would give them a competitive 
edge.  
 
 Narrow banks need only limited amounts of capital to cover fixed assets, protect 
against fraud and other risks and operate with low margins. Hence, they can 
achieve competitive returns on equity. Possible synergies between the transaction 
services at narrow banks and other financial products offered by affiliate 
companies would further increase their investment value. 
 
 Narrow banking would have several advantages when compared with traditional 
banking. Narrow banking would treat checking accounts as a vehicle to provide 
liquidity necessary for transactions purposes. It would be associated with a more 
flexible framework for lending and other banking functions, thereby making much 
of the regulatory burden unnecessary. It offers depositors complete safety. 
 
 Narrow banking focuses on transaction accounts and services. It may be better 
suited to provide for an efficient and stable payments system using developments 
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in information and communication technology. Affiliates may be able to better 
adjust to the shift toward direct investment and nonbank savings products. 
5. Narrow banking and financial and credit market stability 
 Banks have provided liquidity during financial crises with the support they 
receive in the form of deposit guarantee, access to the discount window, and the 
various government commitments. 
 
 There is some concern that narrow banking would not provide the same 
protection against financial instability and that lending affiliates would not be 
immune to problems inherent in traditional banking. However, narrow banking can 
serve as the foundation of a stable payments system, thereby eliminating a source 
of economic and monetary instability. Lending affiliates would have to depend on 
the same factors that helped stabilize private credit markets, like strong capital 
backing and a longer term debt structure. 
 
 Market forces would give affiliates strong incentives to curtail funding of 
speculative activities. Investors who are fully at risk would be less amenable to 
fund questionable loans than depositors with insurance protection and short-term 
horizon.  
 
 The “lender of last resort” function has to be maintained as economic 
fluctuations would continue. Liquidity would be provided directly to affiliates and 
other uninsured lenders in the event of a systemic credit collapse.  
6. Monetary policy and narrow banking 
 Narrow banking raises many monetary policy questions with regard to direct 
monetary policy tools as well as its influence on the structure and relationship of 
the monetary aggregates, the behavior of the short-term securities market, and the 
manner in which money is created and expanded. None of these technical issues 
has been considered in a thorough fashion. While narrow banking does not appear 
to have any obvious drawbacks with regard to monetary policy, many of its policy 
effects will need to be analyzed more carefully before implementation. 
7. International implications of narrow banking  
 If a country adopts narrow banking within its own borders, foreign banks 
entering this country would need to establish narrow banks as well as uninsured 
affiliates. Banks in a narrow banking country should be provided international 
banking charters to allow them to expand abroad by establishing separate banks 
that would operate without compromising the safety of narrow bank depositors.  
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D. Narrow Banking and Banking Theory 
 This section summarizes the relevant literature of banking theory done by Shy 
and Stenbacka (2000). Economists view depository institutions as “pools of 
liquidity” providing households with insurance against idiosyncratic shocks that 
affect their consumption needs (Shy, Stenbacka 2000). In the model of Diamond 
and Dybvig (1983), banks provide liquidity to depositors “who are, ex ante, 
uncertain about their intertemporal preferences over consumption sequences.” 
Along the same lines, Bryant’s (1980) and Villamil’s (1991) models, demand 
deposits serve to meet liquidity shocks that are “neither publicly observed nor can 
be insured”. Deposit contracts offer such insurance and consequently a Pareto 
efficient allocation of risk. However, Diamond and Dybvig show that there exists a 
second inefficient Nash equilibrium where the interaction between pessimistic 
depositor expectations generates bank runs and deposit insurance systems can 
eliminate such equilibrium. Jacklin (1987) introduces to the Diamond-Dybvig 
model a market for outside investment opportunities, but he stops short of 
considering the effects of bank runs on depositors’ welfare. He assumes a 
continuum of depositors, which enables banks to avoid runs completely by 
maintaining a reserve ratio that is no less than “the probability of a liquidity shock 
of a representative depositor.” 
 
 Despite its indisputable benefits, empirical observations as well as theoretical 
research demonstrate how deposit insurance encourages banks to engage in 
excessive risk taking (Cooper and Ross, 1998). As the most natural of the 
conceivable mechanisms for reducing the instability of the banking system, some 
propose narrow banking (Freixas and Rochet 1997), where banks are required to 
back demand deposits entirely by safe and liquid short-term assets. 
 
 Wallace (1996), using a dynamic model, argues against narrow banking by 
showing that it is antagonistic to the efficient provision of liquidity insurance. 
Meanwhile, Shy and Stenbacka (2000) show that Wallace’s result may fail to hold 
when consumers have access to investment opportunities outside the banking 
industry. Since most developed economies possess liquid investment markets 
outside the banking industry, there are no social gains associated with bundling 
deposits with risk, through combining deposit-taking and risky lending. In such 
case, the welfare of consumers might be better served by narrow banking. They 
show that the introduction of deposit insurance will always be welfare reducing 
under a wide-banking policy and that it cannot substitute for narrow-banking 
policies in “any welfare-improving way.” 
 
 Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (1999) investigate whether there is a real economic 
synergy between deposit-taking and lending. Without such synergies, deposit 
insurance would encourage an artificial gluing together of the two activities. In 
contrast, narrow banking would break-up such artificial combination. Papers 
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favoring wide banking use ad hoc assumptions regarding the existence of such 
synergies which automatically justify wide banking (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein, 
1999). According to Shy and Stenbacka (2000), a strong correlation between 
deposit withdrawals and the degree of non-pledgeable returns on illiquid loan-
financed projects will reduce the likelihood of having these synergies. They believe 
that such a correlation attributes a major cause for the emergence of banking crises.  
 
 The opinion of Shy and Stenbacka is in line with the predictions of the credit 
cycle models, e. g., Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), that the interaction between debt 
and collateral values can amplify fluctuations facing an economy3. Also, it would 
find support in Lamont’s (1995) model emphasizing the macroeconomic costs of 
debt overhang. 
 
 In Shy and Stenbacka’s model, consumers’ welfare is higher under narrow-
banking than wide-banking. In the latter case, consumers are unable to deposit their 
money in riskless banks, thereby forcing them to sacrifice liquidity. Narrow 
banking actually increases the variety of investment means consumers can utilize 
to intertemporally transfer money across periods. It adds a riskless money storage 
technology which is unavailable under wide banking. 
E. Narrow Banking and Deposit Insurance 
 Narrow banking involves financing loans with longer term borrowing, rather 
than demand deposits. The possibility of panic would therefore become remote 
(Gorton and Pennacchi, 1993, and Miles, 2001), and deposit insurance, as well as 
its inefficiencies can be done away with.  
 
 Deposit insurance has led to greater financial stability since its inception and 
until the 1980s. However, it can lead to moral hazard. The savings and loan failures 
of the 1990s, Japan’s decade-long struggles with non-performing loans, and the 
role of failed banking systems in many East Asian nations leading up to the 1997 
currency attacks are examples of encouraging risky lending at taxpayer expense 
caused by deposit insurance (Miles, 2001).  
 
 During 1989 and 1990, much of the reserves that insured deposits were depleted 
due to widespread bankruptcies and compromised equity positions of commercial 
banks. In 1991, instead of applying extensive reforms, the Congress decided to 
provide $70 billion to replenish the insurance fund in line with its pledge of the 
                                                     
3 Holmstrom and Tirole (1998) have developed the implications arising from limited 
pledgeability of the returns of illiquid projects for asset pricing, thereby offering a theory of 
how agency costs should be reflected in asset pricing models, which incorporate liquidity 
premia. 
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1930s that defined deposits at insured institutions would always be at par.  
 
 Many economists stress the following factors that must be considered in 
relationship with deposit insurance (Spong, 1993). 
 
i) A safe transactions and clearing system is becoming increasingly critical to 
financial welfare.  
ii) Given the payments technology available today and the level of resources 
devoted to the banking system and its regulation, the typical depositor 
would prefer and expect a high degree of safety and certainty in financial 
transactions.  
iii) Most checking account holders use their accounts for making and receiving 
payments and have far less of a concern over their investment aspects. 
Consequently, occasional disruptions could reduce public confidence in the 
financial system, keep the level of business activity below its full potential, 
and divert an inordinate volume of resources toward tracking transactions 
or using less efficient alternatives.  
iv) Depositor discipline and the threat of loss for uninsured deposits may be 
hard to enforce. Many large depositors, for instance, may have the ability 
to react more quickly than the regulatory authorities in problem bank 
situations. They may also be able to find ways to circumvent any deposit 
insurance changes and thus avoid being exposed to losses.  
v) Major deposit disruptions and losses could be harmful to a wide variety of 
bank customers, the national economy and its credit base, and the banking 
and payments systems reputation.  
vi) Deposit insurance has given weak or high risk lenders virtually the same 
access to funds as the strongest lenders, thus diverting notable portions of 
bank lending toward less worthy ventures and away from alternatives more 
consistent with market needs.  
vii) Countries attempting to reform, especially the USA, take a few steps to 
encourage more market discipline and limit access to funding by problem 
institutions, while giving bank regulators greater responsibility for 
controlling bank risk taking, and leaving less of a role for bankers and 
other participants in the marketplace. Deposit guarantee reform is no 
substitute for market forces and proper bank management. It often imposes 
a substantial cost burden on both problem and sound banks, while turning 
much bank decision making away from bankers and more to bank 
regulators, examiners, and lawmakers. 
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F. Narrow-Banking and Monetary Reform 
 Narrow banking has been associated with monetary reform proposals since the 
great depression. This section provides some of the main proposals and their 
relationship to narrow banking.  
 
I. The Chicago plan4 
 
 The Chicago economists advanced their plan of reform right after the great 
depression of 1930. In reaction to comments from a number of individuals, Henry 
Simons prepared another version in November 1933 that included a supplement on 
“Long-time Objectives of Monetary Management” and an appendix on “Banking 
and Business Cycles”. The plan emphasized that the answer lay in the abolition of 
fractional reserve banking, so that a reconstituted Federal Reserve would have 
simple rules of monetary policy; and achievement of a price-level specified by 
Congress.  
 
 The proposal, called for (Phillips, 1992a):  
 
1. Outright government ownership of the Federal Reserve Banks; 
2. Guarantee of deposits of member banks subject to full supervisory control 
over their management.  
3. The issue of Federal Reserve Notes as legal tender in any amounts which 
may be necessary to meet demands for payment by depositors, while 
suspending the operations of the gold standard5.  
4. Liquidate the assets of all member banks, pay off liabilities, and dissolve all 
existing banks. New institutions should be created which accepted only 
demand deposits subject to a 100% reserve requirement in lawful money 
and/or deposits with the Fed.  
5. Saving deposits would be handled through the incorporation of investment 
trusts.  
6. Present banking institutions would continue deposit and lending functions 
under Federal Reserve supervision until the new institutions can be put into 
place.  
7. The government should raise the price level by 15 percent by fiscal and 
currency means but further inflation (beyond 15 percent) be prevented.  
                                                     
4 The narrative in this section has been adapted from Phillips, 1992a. 
5 That entails suspension of free-coinage of gold, embargo on gold import, prohibition of 
private export of gold, call in all gold coins in exchange for Federal Reserve notes, 
suspension of the gold-clause in all debt contracts, and substantial government sale and 
export of gold abroad. 
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8. Enacting a simple rule of monetary policy.  
9. Achievement of a price-level specified by Congress: this could be done 
through a monetary policy rule which sets money supply growth.  
 
 The plan would displace existing commercial banks by deposit banks and 
investment trusts. The latter would acquire funds exclusively by sale of their own 
securities, thereby limiting-their lending capacity to the funds so obtained.  
 
 By June 1933, many of the proposals contained in the March memoranda had 
been enacted, except for applying the 100% reserve requirement. 
 
 The Chicago faculty prepared a draft bill which was introduced to Congress on 
June 6, 1934. The bill proposed to (1) segregate demand from savings deposits; (2) 
require banks to keep 100% reserves against their demand deposits and 5% 
reserves against their savings deposits; (3) set up a Federal Monetary Authority 
(FMA) with full control over the supply of currency, the buying and selling of 
government securities, the gold price of the dollar; (5) have the FMA take over 
enough of the bonds of the banks to provide 100% reserve against their demand 
deposits; and (6) have the FMA raise the price level to its 1926 position and keep it 
there by buying and selling government bonds.  
 
 As a consequence of this bill, the only money that would exist would be either 
currency issued by the Federal Monetary Authority, or in demand deposits backed 
100% by lawful money (gold) or government securities. The legislative bill would 
retain squarely within the federal government the power given to it in the 
Constitution to create money and maintain its value. This bill would also achieve 
the other long-run New Deal objectives of raising the price level and to strengthen 
government’s influence on economic activity, in this case, through monetary 
policy. 
 
 The Chicago plan did not lose because its principles were rejected but as a 
matter of pure political expediency. In fact, the banking legislation passed during 
the period moved in part toward the Chicago plan reforms.  
 
 The 100% reserve idea did not disappear after the passage of the Banking Act of 
1935. Irving Fisher spent the remainder of his life lobbying Congress and the 
public on the need for 100% reserves. In recent years, we have seen the emergence 
of “narrow banking” or “core banking” proposals which are in the tradition of the 
100% reserve plan. If we are ever again faced with economic and particularly 
financial problems on the level of the Great Depression, the clamor for the 
separation of the depository and lending function of banks may reappear. 
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II. Maurice Allais Proposals 
 Maurice Allais views the credit created by fractional reserve banking as the 
equivalent of counterfeiting. Following Irving Fisher, Henry Simons, and others in 
the 1930s, both Allais and Milton Friedman have long advocated this reform 
(Allais 1948; Friedman 1960). 
 
 Recently, James Tobin (1985, 1987) and others (Litan 1987, Spong 1989, 
Burnham 1991) have advocated narrow banking to enhance the safety of the 
payments system and eliminate the costs associated with the present system of 
federal deposit insurance (Phillips, 1992b). Tobin proposes two types of financial 
institutions: those that keep demand deposits subject to 100% reserves and those 
which lend on the basis of an issue of equity (investment trusts).  
 
 Allais criticized the Chicago plan for defining the money supply as currency 
plus demand deposits while he defines it to include, in addition, all other financial 
assets viewed as money (Phillips 1992b). 
 
 At any time, bank assets maturities are shorter than the maturities of their 
liabilities (Allais 1948). The degree of substitutability of time deposits for cash is 
crucial to the creation of money ex-nihilo. The degree of substitutability is unity for 
demand deposits and less than unity for time deposits. The total money supply 
should thus be defined as currency, demand deposits, and a portion of time deposits 
that are considered as substitutes for cash. The Chicago plan implicitly assumes the 
latter to be zero. 
 
 Simons was aware of this problem, as he recognized that savings-deposits, 
treasury certificates, and even commercial paper are almost as close to demand 
deposits as are demand deposits to cash. He noted that little would be gained by 
putting demand deposit banking on a 100% basis, while at the same time, 
increasing disposition to hold, and the facilities for holding, liquid “cash” reserves 
in the form of time deposits (Phillips, 1992b). 
 
 Allais’ proposal requires deposit banks to be subject to a 100% reserves and be 
forbidden to make loans. Lending institutions would be managed on the principle 
that all lending for a given term would be financed by borrowing of at least the 
same term. Whereas now banks borrow short and lend long, Allais would require 
that they borrow long and lend short (Allais 1948: 525). 
 
 Allais has six fundamental objections to the system of fractional reserve 
banking: 
 
1. The creation and destruction of money by private banks;  
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2. Sensitivity of the credit mechanism to short-term economic fluctuations;  
3. The basic instability engendered by borrowing short and lending long;  
4. The distortion of income distribution by the creation of ‘false claims’;  
5. The impossibility of control over the credit system; and  
6. Efficient control of the aggregate money supply is impossible.  
 
 The two fundamental principles guiding reform as advanced by Allais are: 
 
• The creation of money should be the business of the state, and of nobody 
else, and  
• No money should be created outside the monetary base, so that no one 
would be entitled to the benefits that attach to the creation of bank money 
(Allais 1948). 
 
 It remains an open question whether you can find reasonable estimates for the 
substitution ratios between time deposits and cash. This is perhaps the greatest 
difficulty in the implementation of Allais’s reform next to the political hurdles. 
III. Reaction to the Financial Crises of the 1980s 
 According to Anthony Solomon, the 1980s “deregulation of deposit institutions 
(both commercial banks and thrift institutions)-while maintaining virtually 
unlimited access to the extensive safety net of cheap Federal deposit insurance 
without forceful, independent, official supervision-was a recipe for disaster, ” 
(Solomon,1992). Some of his major recommendations are:  
 
Restrictions on Federal deposit insurance (resembling some “narrow- bank- 
proposals) 
Increased accountability of banks’ management and boards, and the imposition of 
sanctions as a deterrent 
Leveling the playing field across institutions, markets, and countries, necessitating 
comprehensive regulation across functional lines 
 
 Pollock notes the severity and scope of problems plaguing finance in recent 
years (Pollock, 1992). He points to a disturbing pattern in the ratio of capital to 
loans (e.g. loan leverage), the ratio of loans and assets to capital, and the unabated 
acceleration of asset leverage.  
 
 Pollock recommends uncollateralized money or narrow banking as the 
framework for the optimal banking system to ensure the stability of banks and the 
payments system by enforcing collateral requirements to secure the stock of 
money. 
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III. ALTERNATIVES TO NARROW BANKING 
 Bossone (2002) offers some alternatives to narrow banking that, he claims, 
would contribute to increased financial market completeness, spur competition 
within the banking sector, and strengthen market discipline, without suppressing 
conventional banks. In his words, “the patient’s health would be restored through 
good medicine, not euthanasia”. 
 
 Bossone refers to Mishkin (1999), where the latter has proposed a free-choice 
regulatory alternative that would allow banks to provide customers with a choice 
between safe accounts and traditional ones. The alternative would not eliminate the 
risks inherent in conventional banking, but keeps the money creation power to 
banks, provide cautious investors with risk-proof money instruments, and allow 
financial institutions and their customers the option of conventional and/or narrow 
banking instruments.  
 
 Bossone finds the alternative put forward by Bryan (1991) appealing. According 
to Bryan’s “core banking” model, the scope of banking would be narrowed to 
activities in which banks have a demonstrated comparative advantage: issuing 
checking, savings, and money market deposit accounts; providing payment, trust, 
and custody services; and offering loans to individuals, small businesses and 
medium-sized companies. Core banks would not lend to large corporations or 
developing countries, engage in highly leveraged transactions or large commercial 
real estate projects, undertake the global money market activities of large money 
center banks or large regional banks, or underwrite securities. 
 
 Bossone offers two more alternatives that would provide additional incentives 
for banks and depositors to exercise prudence and, at the same time, would 
preserve conventional banking. Banks could issue uninsured deposits bearing an 
option clause that gives banks, in the event of liquidity problems, the right to 
suspend deposit convertibility for a predetermined interval during which it would 
liquidate its assets in an orderly fashion. Meanwhile, banks’ deposits would 
continue to circulate in the payment system. In order to induce depositors to accept 
such a provision, the bank would commit to pay an interest penalty or a premium 
on the deposit interest rate in the event it invoked the option. 
 
 Banks could also issue subordinated debt, as proposed by Keehn (1989), Wall 
(1989) and Calomiris (1999). In the event of insolvency, a bank would have to 
make good on its subordinated debt only after depositors were reimbursed. 
Presumably holders of these securities would be more capable than most depositors 
of ascertaining the soundness of a financial institution. Their assessments would be 
reflected in the market value of the subordinated debt. In turn, these prices would 
provide the community with a valuable signal as to the relative stability of the 
issuing banks, thereby lessening the need for regulation. 
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IV. NARROW BANKING & ISLAMIC BANKING 
 Islamic banking provides for payment-settlement as well as credit-provision 
arrangements. The former arrangements center around demand deposits while the 
latter depends on using Islamic modes of finance to provide credit to the economy. 
We can therefore look at Islamic banking from three vantage points. The first 
relates to the relationship between demand depositors and banks. The second 
relates to the relationship between savers and banks. The final vantage point relates 
of the relationship between banks and fund users. The three relationships are 
explained below. 
A. Demand Depositors and Islamic Banks 
 Demand deposits in Islamic finance are considered as loans that must be paid on 
demand. The monetary system must therefore be structured to eliminate all risk 
involved in fulfilling banks obligations towards demand depositors. That is why 
some economists called for the application of 100 percent required reserve ratio to 
demand deposits (Al-Jarhi, 1983). The proposal for 100 percent required reserve 
ratio can also be justified on the basis of efficiency, stability and equity. The 
reasons for the first two bases run similar to those used in support of narrow 
banking. 
 
 On the side of efficiency, the banking system requires no deposit guarantee 
scheme, is more responsive to market forces and less encumbered with regulations. 
The social cost of running the banking system would certainly be less than in the 
case with fractional reserves. Banks under the system of 100 percent reserves are 
deprived from the ability to issue money (Al-Jarhi, 2002). They would therefore 
have less monopoly power6. We can therefore conclude that such a system would 
be more efficient. 
 
 On the side of stability, the banking system would be less likely to face runs on 
banks, because of the application of 100 percent reserves. In addition, debt is not 
sellable in an Islamic financial system, except at nominal value, while it can be 
swapped against assets and other goods and services. The absence of an integrated 
debt market reduces the possibilities for the phenomenon of hot money to play a 
role at times of crisis (Al-Jarhi 2003).  
 
 On the side of equity, we must note that money as a means of exchange owes its 
quality to the general acceptance by the public. Naturally, the direct benefits of 
                                                     
6 Banks would be expected to continue to enjoy monopoly profit, to the extent that banking 
licences are not given to all applicants, but they will forgoe monopoly profits from issuing 
money.  
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issuing money (seigniorage) should be given to the public, rather than to a small 
group of bankers. Seigniorage should, therefore, be given to the government to 
spend for the benefits of the public.7 Some have found that share of banks from the 
monopoly rent of issuing money in several member countries of the Islamic 
development bank are no less than one percent of GDP and could go even much 
higher (Al-Jarhi, 2002). Therefore, we can say that the fractional reserve system 
redistributes wealth to the advantage of few bankers and at the expense of the 
whole society. This certainly runs contrary to equity. 
B. Savers and Islamic Banks 
 Savers can carry out direct investment, purchase financial instruments or hold 
investment deposits. The latter option amounts to entrusting a bank with investing 
ones savings. Investment deposits can be unrestricted, i.e., authorizing the bank to 
place their proceeds in the general investment pool of the bank, or restricted, i.e., 
authorizing the bank to place them in specific projects, sectors, or funds. According 
to the rules of Islamic finance, investment deposits are entrusted with banks on a 
profit-loss-sharing basis. The bank sets from the beginning the percentage of profit 
that would be allocated to each investment-deposit holder. Investment deposits are 
not guaranteed except in cases of negligence or unethical behavior on the part of 
the bank.  
 
 This is similar to the mutual fund or investment bank concept that has been 
associated with narrow banking. The main difference is that the same bank can 
provide demand deposit services and accept investment deposits at the same time. 
Each bank can handle both transactions and investment services simultaneously. 
 
 While investment deposits are not guaranteed, the following measures or 
something similar can be applied: 
 
• Banks can set up provisions from their own resources against unexpected 
losses. 
• Banks can set provisions from their own resources to stabilize profits 
distributed to investment depositors. In times of low profit, banks can simply 
reduce their profit share and increase the share of depositors, while debiting 
the difference to the profit stabilization provisions.  
• The monetary authority can set rules, e.g., capital adequacy, to increase the 
ability of banks to meet their obligations to investment deposit holders in 
cases of negligence or unethical behavior.  
                                                     
7 Ideally, seigniorage should be distributed over all citizens in proportion to their money 
holdings. 
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 Obviously, such a system provides more stability to the banking system, as the 
profit distributed to banks will depend on the performance of their investments. 
Investment deposits would have preset maturities, which leave no room for runs on 
banks.8 
C. Investment and Islamic Banks  
 Banks can finance investment through two main categories of modes of finance. 
The first is the profit-and-loss sharing modes, which includes forms of equity 
(sharing in both capital and management), and forms of fund placement or 
mudarabah. The second category includes several forms of commodity finance. 
 
 The latter category provides fixed-income placements for banks, as it provides 
finance of commodity purchase on the basis of mark-up. A mixture of commodity 
and profit-and-loss sharing finance could provide the bank the right combination of 
risk and return.  
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 As seen from above, the narrow banking proposal has merits that become 
specially obvious in economic analysis when other opportunities of investment 
outside the banking sector are recognized. It bears similarities with Islamic 
banking, to the extent that demand deposits are guaranteed both theoretically and 
practically. Under narrow banking, the role of investment banks would carry 
features similar to Islamic banking when the relationship between savers and banks 
are considered. However, when it comes to financing investment, Islamic banks 
avoid trading future for present money, while conventional investment banks stick 
to the interest-based modes of finance. 
 
                                                     
8 Banks can offer “passbook investment accounts, which can be augmented and withdrawn 
at any time, similar to the “passbook saving accounts” offered by conventional banks.  Such 
accounts are expected to earn a much lower profit share than maturity-specific investment 
deposits. 
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